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 and
 MOHAMED SALAH MATOUSSI
 GREQE, Universite' de Tunis
 First version received August 1990; final version accepted April 1995 (Eds.)
 This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral
 hazard in the provision of effort and financial constraints. The model is compatible with a large
 variety of contracts as observed in the region of El Oulja in Tunisia. Using an original data set
 including financial data, various tests of the theory are undertaken. Production functions stressing
 the role of effort are estimated. The data support the theory which predicts lower efficiency when
 the tenant's share of output is lower. The role of financial constraints in explaining which type of
 contract is selected (as well as the implications that financial constraints have upon effort and
 therefore output) are supported by the data.
 1. INTRODUCTION
 Following Adam Smith, all economists until Johnson (1950) have considered sharecrop-
 ping to be a "practice which is hurtful to the whole society", an unexplained failure of
 the invisible hand that should be either discouraged by taxation (A. Smith) or improved
 by appropriate sharing of variable factors (Schickele (1941), Heady (1947)). Johnson
 (1950) starts from the empirical observation that "the deviations from optimum (induced
 by sharecropping contracts) are not immediately obvious from a cursory examination of
 American farms operating under different types of tenure arrangements". He then argues
 that the landlord can approach the desired intensity of cultivation by detailed contracting
 and monitoring, by providing other inputs and keeping the size of the individual unit
 small, to decrease (by an income effect) the farmer's marginal disutility of effort, or by
 the use of short-term contracts. However, he admits that his theory does not quite explain
 why sharecropping contracts seem to do as well as rental contracts.
 The next main step' in the understanding of sharecropping was achieved by stressing
 tenants' risk aversion. The rental contract does not provide an appropriate sharing of risk.
 Sharecropping results from the trade-off beween incentives and risk sharing (Stiglitz
 1. The solution proposed by Cheung (1968) amounts to assuming that labour intensity can be chosen by
 the landlord. Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971), in an otherwise unsatisfactory model, correctly stress that the
 landlord cannot decide how much labour the sharecropper puts in his land. Shaban (1987) provides empirical
 evidence against the idea that landlords can completely monitor effort.
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 (1974), Newbery (1977))2. A positive role for sharecropping is finally found as a second-
 best way of inducing effort by risk-averse tenants. Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) extend
 this insight by showing, as second-best theory suggests, that the landlord should intervene
 in all markets (credit market and input markets) in which the tenant transacts, in order
 to mitigate the inefficiency resulting from the above trade-off.
 More recently, various papers (see Singh (1987) for a survey) focus on an asymmetry
 of information between tenants and landlords. Tenants are screened for their ability (or
 some other variable of private information) by the various contracts. However, the stability
 of the population in the village we study (El Oulja) makes these informational explanations
 quite unconvincing. Everybody seems to be aware of the abilities of every member of the
 village.
 Other models stress the imperfections of some markets to explain various features of
 tenancy choices, for example missing markets for some inputs such as bullocks, technical
 know-how, family labour (Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), Bliss and Stern (1982), Pant
 (1983), Reid (1976)).
 Our main emphasis will be on missing credit markets3 when effort levels are not
 observable. We are not the first ones to stress these features. However, with one exception
 we became aware of after writing a first draft of this work, papers discussing credit
 constraints do not use these constraints as an explanation of sharecropping. Braverman
 and Srinivasan (1981) show that preventing either landlords from providing credit to
 tenants or the provision of credit by the government does not affect the welfare of tenants.
 This is due to the fact that in their model landlords can control effort levels by varying
 the size of the plot given to a tenant. The authors "take it as given that the only form of
 tenancy is sharecropping". Jaynes (1982) has also emphasized credit constraints but by
 assuming that landlords are more constrained than tenants4.
 In a contribution which is the closest to our paper Shetty (1988) develops a model
 where sharecropping is explained by an ex post liability constraint. In bad states of nature,
 the rent cannot be paid completely. Even with risk-neutral tenants limited liability intro-
 duces non-concavities in the landlord's and tenant's payoff functions. Sharecropping miti-
 gates within the relationship the associated insurance problem. Shetty's assumption that
 tenants' assets can be appropriated costlessly by landlords is inadequate for the village we
 observe. We are led instead to write an ex ante financial constraint which, in the absence
 of moral hazard, explains the emergence of sharecropping, but not inefficient outcomes.
 An ex ante financial constraint and moral hazard will be the two main building blocks of
 our stylized model.
 The data are briefly described in Section 2 (the Appendix gives summary statistics of
 the data). Section 3 describes the interaction of moral hazard in the tenant's effort level
 and of the financial constraint in the design of efficient contracts. The model of Section 3
 is extended in Section 4 to account for the landlord's financial constraints, variable sizes
 of plots, risk aversion, repeated relationships, etc. Section 5 is devoted to the estimation
 of production functions including an effort variable. Strong empirical support is given to
 the need for considering incentives in the estimation of production or cost functions.
 Section 6 provides an empirical analysis for the choices of contracts and confirms the
 2. Risk aversion alone is not enough. As shown by several authors a sharecropping contract can then be
 mimicked by an appropriate combination of rent and wage contracts.
 3. See Braverman and Guasch (1986) for empirical evidence on the difficulties to provide rural credit in
 LDC's.
 4. A referee pointed out a reference to Marx who stressed that sharecropping permits an "individual who
 is not himself a capitalist to have a capitalist for a partner" in Jaynes (1982).
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 important role played by financial variables in explaining the type of contract selected by
 a landlord and a tenant. Concluding comments are gathered in Section 7.
 2. THE DATA
 A survey carried out with the help of the Tunisian National Institute for Statistics has
 been conducted in 1986 in a rural area known as El Oulja, 40 miles west of Tunis. One
 hundred families have been concerned with this survey which includes three types of data.
 (i) General information about the families with, in particular, the number of days
 worked in agriculture.
 (ii) Information about each plot of land defined as a piece of land where only one
 type of crop is carried out each season. Data include size of plot, type of crop,
 type of labour contract used (either wage contract or fix rent contract or share-
 cropping contract), production levels, precise amounts of labour inputs as well
 as precise amounts of other inputs.
 (iii) Wealth and income data for each family.
 A similar survey was undertaken in 1988 with somewhat less care. We will use data
 from it only to test the robustness of our results (see the appendix for more on the data).
 3. CONTRACTING WITH FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND
 MORAL HAZARD
 As recognized now in the literature (see Reid (1987), Singh (1987)), the theory of share-
 cropping is best viewed as a sub-field of the theory of the firm. One cannot expect "one
 particular explanation of managerial structure to be uniquely powerful over a long period
 of time and across many cases" (Reid (1987), p. 565). Any model of sharecropping must
 stress specific features of the data to be explored. The purpose of this section is to develop
 a simple model incorporating the basic ideas we found useful in explaining the character-
 istics of sharecropping in El Oulja. The model will then be enriched to account for a
 number of interesting but secondary aspects of the contracting problem we study and to
 relax some assumptions of the basic model.
 The production function of an elementary piece of land, called a plot, is written:
 y5=f(le, x) + -, f increasing and concave, (1)
 where y is output, 1 is the amount of labour input, e is the average level of effort applied
 to these units of labour (le= 1 is labour in efficiency units), x is the amount of other
 material inputs, and E is a zero-mean random variable.
 Land is owned by landlords who contract with tenants to organize production. A
 general contract is defined by three parameters (a, ,B, r) which are, respectively, the share
 of the product kept by the tenant, the share of material inputs paid by the tenant and the
 certain payment made by the tenant to the landlord. This general form of contract encom-
 passes all types of contracts used.
 A pure rental contract (RC) is associated with a = 1, ,B=1, and r> 0.
 A pure wage contract (WC) is associated with a = 0, ,B=0, and r <0.
 A sharecropping contract (SC, a; ,B) is associated with a e (0, 1), / Be (0, 1) and r >0.
 If we denote yi(le), with yv(0) = 0, ' > 0, y" > 0 the disutility of labour for the tenant
 his utility level for a contract (a, /B, r) when he works le in efficiency units is, assuming
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Thu, 07 Sep 2017 21:11:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 384 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
 risk neutrality:
 af(le, x)-f3x- yf(le)-r-w
 where w denotes his living expenses at the subsistence level without working. Note also
 that, as we are going to use only a cross-section of data, all prices have been normalized
 to one.
 First, assume that the landlord can observe all variables. If the landlord is risk neutral,
 the efficient contracts solve the following maximization programme:
 max (1-a)f(1, x)-(1 -/3)x+r (2)
 (a,/J,r,l,x)
 subject to
 af(l,x) -/3ix - y(l) - r - w > (A) (3)
 where u is the alternative level of utility the tenant can achieve. The main interior first-
 order conditions of this programme are:
 Lf ] (I-a ) -.f (1 x) + A.[a df(l x) - Vt'1)] = (4)
 (I -a) (I,x)-(l-fl)+A ad (1,x)-fl =0 (5)
 O  LOxI
 I - A = 0 (6)
 or
 -,i (1, x) = VV1) and ' (1, x)= I (7)
 i.e. the efficient allocation of resources is achieved.
 If 1*, x* denote the efficient allocation of resources, (a, /3, r) are chosen so that:
 af (l *, x*)-/3x*-yV(l1*)-r-w=-u (8)
 i.e.,
 a = 1,= 3 = 1 r ( - w for a RC,
 a =O,3=O r=-u-aY(i*)-w for a WC,
 any combination a, ,B, r satisfying (8) for a SC. In the observed share contracts we have
 r=O.
 Any type of contract can therefore fulfill the first-order conditions at the efficient
 allocation of resources.
 Assume now that, because of imperfections in the credit market, the working capital
 R of the tenant is limited. In defining an optimal contract, we must add the constraint:
 w+/3x*+ rR (9)
 but there remain multiple optimal contracts implementing the efficient allocation of
 resources.
 Remark. Constraint (9) is an ex ante financial constraint. It says that the tenant
 must pay for his living expenses (w), for his share of input (,Bx*) and for an eventual rent
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 (r). The rent r may be negative and it is then interpreted as a wage. From the point of
 view of the sharecropper what matters is the aggregate amount of money r + ,Bx* he must
 disburse. As ,B and x* are observable P does not play any independent role in the theoretical
 analysis. Our way of writing the financial constraint implies that any delayed payment to
 the landlord takes place only in the form of a share of output (1- a)(f+ s). An alternative
 (followed by Shetty (1988)) would be to ask for an ex post rent r and obtain min (r, f+ ?).
 Our unmodelled argument to exclude this possibility is that the transaction costs for
 monitoring output would then be as great as in sharecropping while at the same time
 inducing less effort of the landlord (who can give to the tenant all sorts of advices and
 helps). A complete investigation of this question would require introducing moral hazard
 in the insurance with limited liability model of Shetty. Also, this alternative way of sharing
 ex post output appears extremely conflictual in the cases of bad crops. The landlord then
 gets all of the production instead of sharing the consequences of bad states of nature with
 the tenant.
 The logic of the behaviour we postulate for the landlord is to obtain as much cash
 advances from the tenant as possible in the form of rent or material inputs. He then picks
 the lowest a compatible with the tenant's individual rationality constraint.
 From (8) and (9) we have:
 a <f(l* *) . (10)
 Rental contracts and sharecropping contracts with a high share of the product given
 to the tenant may be excluded by financial constraints and the constraint (10) is tight. It
 predicts a positive correlation between a and R that is easy to observe in the data.
 So far the model predicts efficient production, but we pursue the analysis by assuming
 that the tenants's effort levels are unobservable by the landlord (at least beyond some
 monitorable level). We continue to assume that material inputs, x, and labour, 1, are
 observable and consequently can be chosen by the landlord. However, e is chosen by the
 tenant. Hence, the moral hazard constraint5:
 Of
 a ,f (le, x) = yV'(1e). (11
 at
 If no financial constraint existed, then risk neutrality would enable the landlord to
 achieve an efficient allocation of resources by choosing a rental contract (a = 1). The
 tenant would then benefit from all his effort and would choose a socially optimal level of
 effort.
 Consider now the landlord's optimization programme when both a financial con-
 straint for the tenant and the moral hazard constraint (11) exist:
 max (1-a)f(le,x)-(1-f,)x+r (12)
 (a,fl,r,l,e,x)
 subject to
 af(le, x)-f3x-r- y-(le)-w > (13)
 R-fJx-r-w>0 (14)
 a a- -(le, x) - V'(le) = 0. (15)
 5. As f is concave in I and yr convex, the first-order condition (11) is sufficient to characterize the choice
 of effort level.
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 Clearly, if R is large enough (14) is not binding and a rent contract is selected with
 the highest possible value of r which saturates the individual rationality constraint.
 Let us now focus on the case where the financial constraint is binding; (14) can be
 used to substitute the value of r + w + fix to give:
 max (1-a)f(le,x)-x+R-w (16)
 (a,le,x)
 subject to
 af (le, x)-y/(le) > u + R (A) (17)
 a ,f (le, x) - V'(1e) =0. (1l) (18)
 01
 We obtain the first-order interior conditions6:
 (I -a) 4(le, x) + p a 42 (le, x)- I"(le)l=O (19) 81 LOl2
 Of ~~~~~~~02f (I - a) af(le, x) - I + Aa ,f (le, x) + pa - - (le, x) =? (20)
 Ox Ox alox
 (A - 1) f (le, x) + ll 'f(le, x) = O. (21)
 01
 Using (15) and (21) in (19) (20), we finally get, leaving out arguments in the functions:
 Of= + ( -a O2f) (22)
 01~~~2
 l -ua dt
 Of alax (23)
 Ox OfI
 Il-ua a>/f
 The allocation is now inefficient, p >07, the marginal productivity of labour in effi-
 ciency units is too high; the marginal productivity of inputs is also too low (if labour and
 material inputs are not complementary) with an ambiguous result if they are complemen-
 tary. The complete comparative statics of this model is actually quite complex and will
 not be derived.
 However, we can obtain the following proposition which summarizes the main pre-
 dictions of the model.
 Proposition 1.
 (i) The landlord's utility level increases with the tenant's working capital R.
 (ii) Conditionally on the level of other inputs x, the level of effective labour le, and
 therefore the production level, y, are increasing in R.
 6. We assume below that the individual rationality constraint is binding. For R small enough either there
 will be a switch to a wage contract (see below) or the landlord will prefer not to saturate the individual rationality
 constraint to induce some effort. For a fixed x it can easily be checked that dA/dR <0. Therefore depending on
 the production function either the constraint is always binding or it is not binding for R smaller than a threshold
 value. This helps explain why in practice the share of the product left to the worker is never less than 1/2.
 7. Look at (19), and use the concavity off and the convexity of yV.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Thu, 07 Sep 2017 21:11:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 LAFFONT & MATOUSSI SHARECROPPING IN EL OULJA 387
 Landlord's utility level
 RC
 SC
 a=1
 WC a/ /
 a =O
 R
 FIGURE I
 (iii) Conditionally on the level of other inputs x, the tenant's share of output a is
 increasing in R.
 Proof. (i) Follows from the envelope theorem and (ii) and (iii) from a straight-
 forward differentiation of the first-order conditions for the landlord's programme. 11
 Since we have assumed that the tenant's individual rationality level of utility is
 independent8 of his working capital, the level of utility for the landlord is decreasing when
 the tenant's working capital R decreases. Then comes a point at which the landlord prefers
 to incur some monitoring cost9 to ensure a minimal effort level and switch to a wage
 contract. The model so obtained is then compatible with the co-existence of all types of
 contracts that we observe in El Oulja'?.
 In Proposition 1, the monotonicity of y and a in R is obtained only conditionally on
 x. This will be enough for the empirical work. The prediction of Proposition 1 (ii) will be
 explored in Section 5 where we estimate production functions testing for a positive depend-
 ence of production on R or a conditionally on x. Proposition 1 (iii) will be used to test
 in Section 6 the positive dependence of the contract choice on R conditionally on x (and
 also unconditionally). Figure 1 summarizes the analysis. What has not been proved is the
 8. We may also expect (depending on the relative numbers of landlords and tenants) that the tenants with
 a lot of working capital will be able to extract more income than the others. In Figure I we have assumed that
 the bargaining power was in the hands of landlords, tenants being all kept at the di level. The other extreme
 situation would be the one where landlords would be kept at the same level and the increase of utility due to
 more effort (due to higher shares (due to higher working capital)) would benefit tenants. (see Bell (1989) for a
 bargaining model of sharecropping). In this paper we stay in the principal agent framework with u exogenous
 on the grounds that an excess supply of labour is endemic in El Oulja.
 9. If af/la is bounded above, and the tenant is very poor (a very small), sharecropping incentives for
 effort are very low.
 10. Actually, we observe only the values of 1/2, 2/3 and 3/4 for the parameter a in the sharecropping
 contracts.
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 monotonicity of a in R unconditionally as we can expect in general and as illustrated in
 the figure.
 4. EXTENDING THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
 (i) Financial constraints of the landlords
 If the tenant does not have any financial constraint, then the optimal contract is the rental
 contract. It remains the solution even if the landlord has financial constraints since this
 contract does not require any financial participation of the landlord.
 Consider now the case where the tenant's financial constraint is binding. If R' denotes
 the available working capital of the landowner, indexing now by t, the tenant's working
 capital, his optimization programme is:
 max (1- a)f(le, x)-(1 -,B)x+r
 (a,le,f3,x,r)
 subject to
 af(le,- fix - r - (le) >
 R'-,Bx-r-w_O
 a - (le, x)- V'(le) = 0
 R'-(1 -/3)x+r?0.
 From the two tight financial constraints we derive:
 x =R'+ R - w
 r = ((1 -,)R'-JJR'-(1 -/B)w.
 The maximization programme is reduced to:
 max (1 -a) f (le, R'+R'- w)-R'
 (a,je)
 af (le, R'+ R' -w)-R'+ w-t(le) > a (A) (24)
 a af(le, R + R'- w) - yg'(le) =0. (p) (25)
 al
 Restricting the analysis to the case where both constraints are binding we obtain by
 straightforward differentiation
 da _Of/Ox<0
 dR' f
 da I-aaf/lax
 dRt f
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 (if the marginal productivity of other inputs is not too far from the optimum) and
 da _ da >011
 dRt dR'
 The effect of the landlord's wealth on effort or labour alloction in efficiency units
 depends on the sign of a2f/lalx. If labour and material inputs are not complementary
 (a2f/alax < 0), labour is increased. The effect is ambiguous if they are complementary and
 null for a Cobb-Douglas production function.
 We will use these results to test that the landlord's wealth has a negative effect on
 the tenant's share and that the landlord's working capital has no effect on production for
 a Cobb-Douglas specification.
 (ii) Variable size of plots, hired labour
 Let h be the size of the plot alloted to a given head of family who can use lf units of
 familial work where lf is first supposed to be observable. He can also hire an amount I of
 labour at a wage v with a normalized effort level of one enforced by the tenant's monitoring.
 Being essentially non-verifiable by the landlord this labour input is not usually shared.
 (We ignore the subsistence level in this next model).
 The landlord's income is then:
 (1 -a)f(h, If e+ l, x)-(1 -/)x+ r.
 Let VI(e) denote now the disutility of effort for each member of the family who has
 an outside opportunity equal to a.
 The utility level of the family is:
 af (h, lf e + 1, x)-,Bix -vl- r - (e)lf .
 The landlord's maximization programme becomes then:
 max {(1 -a)f(h, lf e, 1, x)-(1 -/P)x+r}
 (ac,3,1h,e,j,x,r)
 af(h, If e, 1, x) -,fx-vl-r-r- V/I(e)lif If u
 a Of = '(e) (if If > 0)
 a v (if 1>0)
 R'-f3x-vl-r _ O.
 By limiting the size or the plot, one might think that the landlord is able to obtain a
 high level of effort from the tenant (Braverman and Srinivasan (1981), Johnson (1950),
 Cheung (1969)). However, if lf is unobservable because the family labour devoted to the
 plot is chosen by the tenant in an unverifiable way an additional moral hazard constraint
 of the choice of If must be added. We are then back to our previous model with a slight
 variation on the specification of the disutility of effort'2.
 11. See Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) for alternative foundations of similar relationships.
 12. The formulation lIV(e) would lead to the same conditional predictions in Section 3.
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 If there is no outside labour used and we have constant returns to scale the problem
 is reduced to our previous formulation if we reason per unit of land:
 max h {(1 - a)g(e'-f, -(1- 3) -+r
 (a,f3,h,e,lf/h,x,?- h h h
 ag( e^-,T h3 1/ h
 aag--- ,'(e)=0
 Rt x if 0 --f --w --r> O
 h h h
 A conclusion of this model is that if there are constant returns to scale, R' and h
 should appear only as the ratio Rt/h in the explanation of the contract chosen. When a
 family works on several crops the working capital normalized by the total surface cultivated
 should be used.
 (iii) Risk aversion-
 So far we have neglected risk aversion in our explanation of contracts. Clearly, risk
 aversion of the tenant may have a role in justifying a smaller share of output for him. As
 risk aversion is usually inversely related to wealth we will test this possibility by testing
 the significance of wealth in the explanation of the main features of the chosen contracts.
 This is certainly is a weak test given the relationship between wealth and working capital.
 (iv) Repeated relationships
 Game theory has familiarized us with the idea that repeated relationships may solve moral
 hazard problems by relying on appropriate threats such as here threat of non-renewal of
 the contract (Johnson (1950)). Financial considerations would explain the form of the
 contract and efficiency would be enforced by repeated relationships'3. We will test this
 idea by introducing the length of the relationship in the productivity equations that we
 will estimate.
 (v) Family labour constraints
 The preceding analysis has assumed that sharecroppers and tenants are not constrained
 in their use of family labour. This is particularly doubtful for sharecroppers who may be
 financially constrained in the land they can rent and therefore have excessive family labour
 in a world where unemployment is widespread. To distinguish the inefficiency of family
 labour in sharecropping due to low effort levels and the inefficiency due to excessive labour
 inputs we will introduce a dummy variable which distinguishes "large size" families from
 ''small size" families where the second effect should not appear.
 13. See Dutta, Ray and Sengupta (1989).
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 5. ESTIMATION OF PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
 Our theoretical analysis suggests that the level of production depends on the level of the
 tenant's working capital. It is easy to exhibit a significant positive correlation between the
 level of working capital and production levels but the economic meaning of this dependence
 is difficult to ascertain given the high correlation between input levels and working capital.
 Instead we have chosen to estimate the effect of the contract type on the production
 levels'4. For given input levels, the level of working capital affects the type of contract
 chosen, therefore the levels of effort and finally the production levels (see Proposition 1).
 This procedure does not raise econometric difficulties if contract types can be considered
 as exogeneous in the production function.
 First, we consider Cobb-Douglas production functions with inputs, family labour
 FL, hired labour HL, and other inputs M, and shift variables Z1, Z2, Z3 defined as
 follows:
 ZI = 1 when the farmer is the owner or has a rental contract
 = 0 otherwise
 Z2= 1 when the farmer is a sharecropper
 = 0 otherwise
 Z3 = t x Z2 where t is the length of the relationship between the landlord and the
 farmer for a sharecropping contract (t is measured in months).
 In the following regressions, Y denotes production per hectare and inputs are evalua-
 ted per hectare. A two-stage least-squares procedure is used for inputs HL and M. Next
 an exogeneity test on Z1, Z2 and Z3 is carried out.
 For the 1986 survey (170 observations) we obtain (t statistics in parenthesis):
 Log Y= 4 8 Z1+ 4.4 Z2+ 0-009 Z3+ 0 20 LogFL+ 0 15 LogHL+ 0-23 logM
 (8 3) (7 7) (5 8) (5 6) (4-4) (2 5)
 R2=0-42
 using as instruments dummy variables indicating the type of the crop (tomato, potato,
 melon, vegetable), the level of wealth, the number of active members in the family.
 We test the exogeneity of Z,, Z2 and Z3 as follows. By the probit technique we obtain
 Z,= 2-7 - 0 5 AGE+ 0-006 (AGE)2+ [-01 logRICH
 (0-8) (2-7) (2.8) (5 6)
 Z2= 1-09 - 0 47 ACT- 0-6 OWL- 0 0007 R'
 (1-8) (2-1) (4 8) (5.1)
 14. An alternative is to test the role of contracts in the allocation of resources by studying the dependence
 of input decisions on contracts. This approach was followed by Shaban (1987) who tested if differences in input
 intensities between rental and sharecropping contracts were significant. He considers that, with monitoring,
 marginal productivities of inputs are equated to prices, while, with no monotoring and sharecropping, prices
 are equated to marginal productivities multiplied by the farmer's share. We believe that the structural form
 representing sharecropping is more complex. We can only rely on input data when those inputs are included in
 the contract and presumed observable. For those (as family labour in efficiency units) that are not observable
 it must be taken into account that they are chosen by the farmer, but they cannot be used in the estimation.
 Indeed, if they were observable, they could be monitored.
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 and by the least-squares method we obtain:
 Z3= 18-2-5-2 log ACT-00009 R'+ 0-0012 R'
 (5-5) (-1-6) (-3-6) (5-4)
 where AGE is age, RICH wealth, ACT the number of working members in the family
 OWL owned land, R' the landlord's working capital. Then the residuals pi, p2 and P3 of
 these regressions are introduced in the following regression:
 Log Y=4 7 Z? + 4-3 Z2+ 0009 Z3+ 0 20 log FL+ 0 15 log HL
 (8) (7 3) (2.2) (5.4) (3.8)
 + 025 log M-002 p I + 0 / I P2 + 000013 P 3
 (2.6) (-0 14) (0.9) (0 04)
 .R2 = 0-42
 As the coefficients of PI, P2, P 3 are not statistically different from zero we can accept
 the exogeneity of Z,, Z2 and Z3.
 These results are confirmed'5 using the data set from 1988 (136 observations)
 Log Y= 5 7 Z, + 5 1 Z2+ 0 009 Z3+ 0 26 log FL+ 0 15 log HL+ 0 09 log M
 (8.7) (8-1) (5.2) (4.4) (3.8) (1-5)
 R2=0 53
 We have also explored an alternative explanation of these results suggested by a
 referee. More able tenants have earned more in the past, have now more working capital
 and therefore are likely to be given rental contracts. To eliminate this effect we restrict
 the analysis to young tenants (less than 35 years old) and obtain similar results.
 In 1986 (67 observations)
 Log Y= 4-6 Z,+ 4.3 Z2+0 006 Z3+ 0 21 log FL+ 0 14 log HL+ 0 25 logM
 (4-6) (4.4) (2.8) (3.3) (2.5) (1.6)
 R2=0-38
 In 1988 (54 observations)
 Log Y= 4.7 Z, + 4.3 Z2+ 0-005 Z3+ 0O26 log FL + 0 10 log HL + 0O28 log M
 (4.7) (4.6) (1.4) (2.3) (1.4) (30)
 R2=0 43
 The significance of contracts in the explanation of production is very stable across
 these different regressions. In all the above regressions we rejected at the 1% significance
 level the hypothesis that the coefficients of Z1 and Z2 are equal. The type of contract
 matters in the explanation of production levels as predicted by the theory. Using for
 reference the results from 1986 we see that moving from a sharecropping contract to a
 rental contract increases production by 50% (compare e48 and e4-4). The effect of the length
 of the relationship between the landlord and the sharecropper is positive and significant. A
 three-year contract of sharecropping increases production by 38%. Independently of the
 15. The exogeneity of the contract variables was also tested positively.
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 type of contract the coefficient of hired labour is 50% less than the coefficient of family
 labour.
 The combination of a Cobb-Douglas production function and the modelling of labour
 in efficiency units lead to a specification where the effect of the contract is similar to a
 Hicks-neutral technical efficiency effect. To test the robustness of our results we change
 the specification by assuming that there may be a different elasticity of production for the
 amount of family labour in the case of rent contracts and in the case of sharecropping
 contracts'6. We obtain:
 In 1986 (170 observations)
 Log Y= 4 2 +0 222 Z,logFL+0 197 Z2logFL+ 0 19 logHL+ 0 28 logM
 (6.8) (5.7) (5.0) (5.0) (2 8)
 A2 =0 31
 In 1988 (n = 136)
 Log Y= 4 5 + 0 39Z,logFL+ 0 32 Z2logFL+ 0 20 logHL+ 0 16 logM
 (6 4) (6.1) (5-0) (5.0) (2.3)
 A2-0 40
 In 1986 (young tenants n = 67)
 Log Y= 3 8 + 0 25 Z, log FL + 0 22 Z2log FL + 0 16 log HL + 0 34 log M
 (3 6) (3.9) (3-5) (2.8) (2.0)
 jR2= 0 31
 In 1988 (young tenants n = 54)
 Log Y= 3 8 + 0 36 Z,logFL+ 0 31 Z2logFL+ 0 14 logHL+ 0 32 logM
 (4 3) (3 3) (2-8) (1 9) (334)
 f?2 =0-30
 With this new specification we also find that the coefficients of family labour in rent
 contracts and sharecropping contracts are significantly different at the 1% significance
 level.
 It may be argued that pervasive unemployment leads to low efficiency of sharecrop-
 ping due to excessive use of family labour. We then introduce a dummy variable Z5 which
 equals 1 if the number of family workers per hectare is larger than 2- 5 and zero otherwise.
 The following result suggests the existence of this excessive labour effect (0 17 significantly
 different from 0- 19 at the 5% level) but also confirms, for families of small size, the lower
 efficiency of family labour in sharecropping contracts compared to rent contracts (0 19
 16. Because of the very high correlation between Z, and Z, log FL (which is 0 96) and the very high
 correlation between Z2 and Z2 log FL (which is 0-98) it is not possible to imbed meaningfully the two models
 obtained within a single model and test the retrictions to which they correspond. We could engage in non-nested
 tests but the purpose here is not to choose the best model, but to check the robustness of our result according
 to which contract variables affect productivity.
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 significantly different from 0-21 at the 5% level)'7. Using the method of 2SLS we obtain:
 In 1986 (n= 170)
 Log Y= 4 2 + 0 21 ZlIogFL+ 0 17 Z2Z5logFL+ 0 19 Z2(1-Z5)logFL
 (6.8) (5.1) (3.7) (4 8)
 +0 19 logHL+0-28 logM
 (5.0) (2.8)
 A2 =0O31
 In 1988 (n = 136) we obtain similar results with a 1% significance level.
 Log Y= 4 5 + 0 37 Z, log FL+ 0 30 Z2 Z5 log FL+ 0 33 Z2 (1 -Z5)log FL+
 (6-5) (5 8) (4 5) (4 9)
 + 0 21 log HL+ 0 16 logM
 (4.9) (2.3)
 Rk2=0 40
 Similarly for the sub-sample of young tenants we still get significant differences in the
 coefficients of family labour in rent contracts and sharecropping contracts. However the
 excessive labour effect disappears for young tenants.
 In 1986 (n=67)
 Log Y= 3.7 + 0 25 Z, log FL+ 0 21 Z2Z5 log FL+
 (3.5) (3.8) (3.4)
 + 0 23 Z2 (1-Z5) log FL+ 0 16 log HL+ 0 35 log M
 (3.3) (2.6) (2.0)
 A2= 0 30
 In 1988 (n=54)
 Log Y= 3 8 + 0 36 Z logFL+ 0 31 Z2Z5logFL+
 (4.3) (3.2) (2.8)
 + 0 31 (1 -Z5)Z2 log FL+ 0- 14 log HL+ (0 32) log M
 (2-7) (I1 9) (3 3)
 A2 =0-38
 Finally, we look at an alternative specification of the incentive effects due to the
 length of the relationship t in sharecropping labour and to the share of input fJ paid by
 the tenant by introducing a parameter of sharecropping labour which depends on both t
 and fJ (for a given a a high fi means a high productivity plot which can support a high
 funding of inputs; the motivation of introducing fi is the discrete nature of a).
 17. There is no reason to test for an excessive labour effect in rental contracts because tenants with rent
 contracts are not financially constrained and therefore should be able to rent enough land for all their family
 labour. Furthermore we are not interested in the pervasive unemployment effect per se, but rather in the difference
 in the efficiency of family labour, stemming from differences in effort, between rental and sharecropping contracts.
 Given that 0-21 is significantly greater than 0-19 we can expect the coefficient of Z,(I - Zs) log FL to be even
 more different from 0 19. So allowing for the excessive labour effect in rental contracts would only strengthen
 the findings.
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 In 1986 (170 observations)
 Log Y= 4 8 + 0 21 Z, log FL+ (0 10+0 002t+0 0005f Z2 log FL
 (8.5) (5.8) (1.3) (4.8) (0 5)
 + 0 15 log HL+ 0 23 logM
 (3.9) (2.5)
 k2= 0-24
 In 1988 (n = 136)
 Log Y= 5-5 + 0-29 Z, log FL+ (0.07 +0-002t+0.0016f Z2 log FL+
 (8.2) (4.7) (0.82) (3 3) (1.6)
 + 0 15 log HL+ 0 12 logM
 (3.8) (1.7)
 A2= 0 50
 In 1986 (young tenants n = 67)
 Log Y= 4 5 + 0 24 Z, log FL + (0. 16 + 0 0012t + 0 0003f3) Z2 log FL
 (4.4) (3 9) (1.4) (2.5) (0.2)
 +0 13 logHL+0 26 logM
 (2.2) (2.2)
 jk2 =0-38
 In 1988 (young tenants n = 54)
 Log Y= 4.3 + 0 30 Z, log FL+ (0 05+ 0 002t + 0 004fJ Z2 log FL
 (4.3) (2.6) (0.3) (0.2) (1-6)
 + 0 12 log HL+ 0 31 logM
 (1.6) (3.2)
 A2 = 042
 Again the coefficient of family labour in rent contracts is significantly different at the
 1% level (5% level only for young tenants in 1988) from the coefficient in the sharecropping
 case (actually the sum of three coefficients computed at the average sample values). Fur-
 thermore, with this new specification we again find that the length of the contract signifi-
 cantly affects positively the productivity of sharecropping labour.
 6. CHOICE OF CONTRACTS
 The previous section has shown the effect of contract type on production. In this section
 we test the role of financial constraints and risk aversion in the selection of contracts.
 The structural form obtained in Sections 3 and 4 is summarized as an ordered probit
 model where the contract type variable, CT takes the values
 0 ifa=1/2
 1 ifa=2/3
 2 if a= 3/4
 3 ifa=1
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 The underlying model is then Z = 3 1+ 32k + f33R'+ 04t Wt+ e with E --,'(0, ca) where
 R' (resp. R') is the tenant's (resp. landlord's) working capital and W' is the tenant's wealth
 CT=0 if z,<po
 1 ifpo<z,<Pl
 2 if <z,?<p2
 3 if zt>p2
 The maximum likelihood estimators of this model are obtained by the Davidson
 (1959), Fletcher and Powell (1963) algorithm and the variance covariance matrix for the
 estimates is the Berndt et al. (1974) estimator using the first derivatives.
 For the 1986 survey we obtain:
 Z=- 036 + 0*0003R'- 00001 R'+ 0 000045 W'
 (2 2) (5.1) (9 5) (1.49)
 with po=0 (normalization).
 p,= 030 P2= =063
 (3*3) (4.1)
 In 1988, we get:
 Z 0- 019 + 00005R'- 0 0004 R'+ 0.0001 W'
 (0 5) (3 5) (-4.4) (2.5)
 with
 pi= 08 P2= 03
 (3 0) (4.1)
 As predicted by the theory the higher the tenant's working capital, the closest to a
 rent contract we are. On the contrary the higher the landlord's working capital the higher
 his share in the sharecropping contract. The wealth effect is of the right sign but not very
 significant, suggesting that financial constraints play a more important role than risk
 aversion in explaining the selection of contracts18.
 The ordered probit model assumes here that the discrete choice between rental and
 sharecropping is governed by the same model that determines whether a = 1/2, 2/3 or
 a = 3/4. To test this hypothesis we run a probit of rental versus sharecropping. Since the
 variance of the error term is not identified in such a probit model we re-scale the parameters
 of the ordered probit with the estimate of the standard error obtained above (6f = O-384).
 The rental/sharecropping choice is then made with the model
 Rental if/31 + 32R'+ f3R'+ f4W'+ ? > O
 where e is now X(0, 1), instead of the previous model
 /3I-P2 /32 03 04 /34 Rental if +-Rt+- +- W + ?>O
 18. An alternative explanation given by a referee uses risk aversion. The more working capital a tenant
 has, the more crops he plants. The more crops a tenant plants, the more diversified he is, so the less risk he
 bears for a given sharing parameter in the contract. However, we did not find any correlation between the
 number of crops (NP) and the size of working capital.
 NP= 2-8 -0000084R' R2= 0 004
 (13-3) (-0 44)
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 where re-scaling is made to have ?/Ca as a A(0, 1) random variable so that the estimators
 Ij and Pi/cr, i= 2, 3, 4 are two estimators of the same value under the null hypothesis of
 no difference between the choice models.
 Noting that f3i/6 is the most efficient estimator we can run Hausman tests.
 As is often the case in small samples the difference in the covariance matrices between
 probit and the re-scaled ordered probit parameters did not turn out to be positive semi-
 definite. Thus to compare the results we simply test that the coefficients of R' and W' are
 the same. For the coefficients R' and W' we obtain X2_statistics which are 5-66 and 0-43
 respectively which are below the 1% significance level which is 6-63.
 We can safely conclude that our assumption of the same choice model for the four
 regimes is not rejected.
 Since the theory only obtained the predictions concerning the effect of working capital
 on contract choices conditionally on the level of inputs we also obtained the maximum
 likelihood estimators for an enlarged model with similar results.
 In 1988 (n= 136)
 Z= -1[2 +0-00058R'-0 00032R'+0 00008W'
 (-16) (2.7) (2.9) (2 0)
 + 0 0055 FL + 0 0020 HL + 0 00026 M
 (2-4) (0.42) (0 40)
 Po=O p,u= 086 P2= 1-35
 (3 0) (4.0)
 In 1986 (n= 170)
 Z=-1 09 + 0 0003 Rt- 0 000l1 R'+ 0 00003 W'
 (2.5) (5*3) (9.01) (1.0)
 +0-00024 FL+0 00047 HL+ 0-001 M
 (1.11) (0-3) (2.3)
 Po=0 p=0-42 P2=067
 (3-3) (4.1)
 7. CONCLUSION
 We have developed a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral
 hazard and financial constraints. The unobservability of effort requires the use of incentive
 contracts to induce good effort levels. This can easily be achieved with rental-contracts
 which leave to tenants all the proceeds of their effort. However, the tenant's financial
 constraints make these contracts often impossible. The poorer the tenant, the smaller the
 share of the crop he will retain and therefore the less effort he will provide.
 Production functions stressing the role of effort have been estimated. They support
 the theory which predicts lower efficiency when the tenant's share of output is lower.
 However, this inefficiency is somewhat mitigated by the length of the relationship between
 the landlord and the tenant. The working capital of the tenant (and of the landlord)
 appear as significant explanations of the type of contract chosen by a tenant. Little empir-
 ical evidence was found for the alternative explanation related to risk aversion (assumed
 to be decreasing with wealth). However, the close link between wealth and working capital
 should qualify this last statement.
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 APPENDIX
 The Data
 V Value of production on the plot. (in Tunisian Dinars (T.D.))
 S Surface of the plot (in hectares)
 FL Family labour in days (per plot)
 HL Hired labour in days (per plot)
 M Cost of inputs other than labour in T.D.
 CT Type of contract CT= 3, 2, 1, 0, for a = I; 3/4, 2/3, 1/2
 R' Tenant's working capital (available monetary liquidities, rented value of various owned equipments)
 Rl Landlord's working capital (the same)
 t Length of the relationship in months
 ,B Percentage of cost of inputs paid by the farmer
 W' Tenant's wealth (value of owned animals, equipment, and land)
 M Cost of seeds, ploughing, transportation, water, other inputs
 L in front of a variable indicates the logarithm of the variable.
 TABLE I
 Descriptive statistics (1986)
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
 V 5785-0 7404 7 280-0 0-4914E+05
 S 2-1538 2-4450 0-2000 12-50
 FL 168-21 156-17 22-00 1160-0
 HL 406-06 643-87 1-000 3600-0
 M 1404-0 1761-2 82-00 0-1149E+05
 Rt 5510-3 5792-3 50 00 0-3500E+05
 R' 2534-3 6027-6 1 000 0-2950E+05
 t 68-565 39-314 6-000 100 0
 I? 83-229 20-324 50 00 100 0
 W' 39274-0 70659-0 501-0 0-4050E+06
 CT 1-8824 1-3667 0 0000 3 000
 TABLE 2
 Descriptive statistics (1988)
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
 V 6913-0 7988-4 600-0 0-5915E+05
 S 2-0188 2-1696 0-1600 14 50
 FL 185-88 192-75 17-00 1715 0
 HL 287-21 403 39 1.0 2571-0
 M 1640-7 2183-4 109.0 0-1709E+05
 Rt 4748-2 3996*2 700 0 0-2500E+05
 RI 1455-1 3437 3 1 000 0-1650E+05
 t 78-824 33 423 6-000 100 0
 I? 87-228 19-861 50 00 100 0
 W' 41537-0 85324-0 601-0 0-4780E+06
 CT 2-1985 12221 0-0000 3-000
 TABLE 3
 Types of contract
 CT 1986 1988
 a =1/2 52 26
 2/3 13 12
 3/4 8 7
 1 97 91
 Total 170 136
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